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Abstract
　　 Background: As labor-intensive agriculture is a common way of life for rural people, especially in developing countries, 
good health is often a key input of agriculture production. In addition, selling livestock is a form of coping responses of rural 
people when facing financial burden. If the community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme achieves its key function in 
financial protection and better health promotion, it is assumed to lead to improved outcomes of agriculture production.
　　 Objective: To evaluate potential impacts of the CBHI scheme on rice production and livestock holdings among rural 
households in Savannakhet Province, Lao DPR.
　　 Method: We employed the technique of inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW) to correct for imbalances in pre-
intervention covariates between treated and untreated samples. 
　　 Findings: Findings from this study suggest that the CBHI scheme significantly increases rice production per capita and the 
number of cow holdings among enrolled households, which both are likely to lead to poverty reduction in the long run.
　　 Key words: Community-based health insurance, inverse probability of treatment weight, rural Lao PDR.
1. Introduction
　　 By reason of irregular occupation and income level, informally employed individuals are often not counted in any payroll-
based health insurance schemes and continue to suffer from the high cost of seeking health care. Over two decades, the community-
based health insurance (CBHI) scheme has been implemented as an attempt to provide financial protection and health equity for 
those people in developing countries (Mathauer et al., 2017). The scheme enrollment is on a voluntary basis, and the pooling of 
health risk and prepayment typically occur at the community level. Under the risk-pooling system, individuals’ financial burdens 
are spread across all scheme members – making health care more affordable for the poor. Therefore, beneficiaries are protected 
against catastrophic costs of illness while ensuring their right to equal access to health services based on their needs.
　　 To ensure that the specific health insurance scheme leads to development outcomes, the impacts of the action for people in 
the informal sector is evaluated by extensive literature. For instance, Spaan (2012) concluded in a systematic review on the impact 
of health insurance in Africa and Asia that the intervention significantly improved financial protection and enhanced service 
utilization, but weak evidence on social inclusion, quality of care, and community empowerment were found. Further, a report 
reviewed by Acharya et al. (2012) on the impact of health insurance schemes for the informal sector in low- and middle-income 
countries found contradictory results of no strong evidence on utilization, financial protection, and health status. It is noticed that 
most of the previous studies primarily examined the impacts of specific health insurance on direct outcomes of financial protection 
and health service utilization (Jutting, 2004; Nguyen et al., 2011; Alkenbrack & Lindelow, 2015; Raza et al., 2016). However, 
Thiptaiya SYDAVONG and Daisaku GOTO70
existing evidence of such direct benefits from developing countries are rather divergent and inconsistent.
　　 Beyond the direct effects, the potential benefits of health insurance might be found on indirect outcomes resulting from less 
out-of-pocket expenditures (OOPs), fast recovery of illness, or improved health status. In developing countries, people living in 
rural areas often depend on labor-intensive agriculture for subsistence and livelihoods, inevitably health status and agriculture 
production are correlated in multiple ways. Good health is an asset for agriculture production as they can work more (Asenso-
Okyere et al., 2011), whereas poor health reduces the capacity to work of the sick individual and the level of output, accordingly 
(Antle & Pingali, 1994). Moreover, when rural dwellers encounter ill-health, which leads to higher OOPs and income loss, the 
common coping responses in the absence of sufficient cash savings are selling livestock, assets, or borrowing to finance health care 
treatment (Sauerborn et al., 1996; Yilma et al., 2014).
　　 There are few studies that examine these hypotheses empirically. Parmar et al. (2012) evaluated whether the CBHI scheme 
protects household assets in rural Burkina Faso. The assets are defined by the monetary value of goods and livestock owned by the 
households. Parmar et al. (2012) found that the scheme participation leads to increasing household assets. Another interesting study 
is the work of Yilma et al. (2015) that assessed the impact of the CBHI scheme on household consumption, income, indebtedness, 
and livestock holdings in Ethiopia. The findings showed that the CBHI scheme reduced reliance on coping response, especially 
borrowing, but no evidence on livestock holdings was found. Due to the limited work on the indirect benefits of the CBHI scheme, 
more empirical evidence is needed, in particular, impacts on agriculture production. In this study, direct outcome is defined as the 
outcomes which are directly targeted by the scheme, including OOPs, service utilizations, and health status, whereas indirect 
outcome is defined as the outcome indicators which are influenced by the direct outcomes, such as household’s income, various 
expenditure categories (except health expenditure), agricultural production, livestock holdings.
　　 The impacts of the CBHI scheme on the indirect outcomes of informal-sector households in rural villages of Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (PDR) is an appropriate case in point to test the hypotheses. Like many other developing countries, in order 
to promote health equity for self-employed people, the government of Lao PDR has focused on the implementation of the CBHI 
scheme since 2002. As the majority of the targeted population resides in remote villages and mainly depends upon labor-intensive 
rice production for income earning and subsistence, good health is often a key input of agriculture production. Unfortunately, we 
do not have the respondent’s data on health status to test this hypothesis. Therefore, we assume that the CBHI scheme has 
improved the health condition of enrolled households, the improved health status might affect the productivity and reliance on 
coping responses, especially selling livestock. Thus, the objectives of this study are to investigate the impacts of the CBHI scheme 
on the rice production and livestock holdings among rural households in Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR. Based on subsample 
analysis, two additional research questions are examined:
　　 1. Do the impacts vary in the presence and absence of CBHI ex-members?
　　 2. Are the impacts divergent in the presence and absence of households engaged in village fund?
　　 The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section is the overview of the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR. Section 
three describes the methodology including sample selection and the econometric model. Section four discusses the results and main 
findings. The conclusion is located in Section five.
2. CBHI scheme in Lao PDR
　　 In Lao PDR, health risk is expected to be an increasing threat to the poor in particularly remote areas (World Health 
Organization, 2012), where the majority of the population remains dependent on agricultural activities for subsistence and the 
infrastructure is inadequate. Therefore, the government is concerned with strengthening the health system – health financing 
schemes in particular – to ensure health equity for all groups in the population. 
　　 To improve the health system, the government launched four health financing schemes targeting specific groups in the 
population, including State Authority Social Security (SASS) for government workers, Social Security Organization (SSO) for 
salaried private and state-owned enterprise employees, Health Equity Funds (HEFs) for the extreme poor, and Community-Based 
Health Insurance (CBHI) for non-poor workers in the informal sector (Ahmed et al., 2013) presented in the 2010 World Health 
Report. There are more and more voices for the benefit of creating a single national risk pool. Now, a body of literature is emerging 
on institutional design and organizational practice for universal coverage, related to management of the three health-financing 
functions: collection, pooling and purchasing. While all countries can move towards universal coverage, lower-income countries 
face particular challenges, including scarce resources and limited capacity. Recently, the Lao PDR has been preparing options for 
moving to a single national health insurance scheme. The aim is to combine four different social health protection schemes into a 
national health insurance authority (NHIA. Among the four schemes, only the CBHI scheme is based on voluntary membership 
and decentralized implementation.
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　　 As of 2014, only 27.2% of the population was covered by any scheme of the health financing system. Moreover, the 
decomposed coverage by a scheme is rather heterogeneous. While the coverage of the SASS and HEFs schemes, which target 
nearly 26.5% of the Lao population, achieved approximately 85% of the target, that of the SSO and CBHI schemes made little 
progress, with only 6.4% of the targeted group enrolled. In particular, the CBHI scheme, which targets approximately two-thirds of 
the Lao population, achieved only 3.7% of the target by 2014 (National Health Bureau, 2014). In other words, the CBHI scheme 
has the largest target but lowest achievement. Therefore, this study intentionally evaluates the CBHI scheme for three main 
reasons: 1. the scheme is voluntary, 2. the targeted population is mainly the poor in rural areas with limited infrastructure and 
geographic constraints, and 3. the scheme has made extremely slow progress towards the given target. 
　　 In 2002, the Ministry of Health (MOH) introduced the CBHI scheme as a pilot project in two districts with technical 
assistance from the World Health Organization and financial support from the United Nations Human Security Fund. As of 
September 2015, the scheme was available in 50 of the 148 districts in 17 of the 18 provinces, which is equivalent to 2,271 of the 
8,507 villages. The total number of beneficiaries is reported at 33,795 households (179,534 people). Currently, the benefit package 
of the CBHI scheme covers outpatient and inpatient services, including primary health care, specialist services, diagnostic tests, 
and prescribed pharmaceuticals that are available in hospitals. The household is the unit of enrollment, and the premiums vary 
depending on urban or rural residence and the number of household members. The premium rates have not been updated since 
2005 (World Bank, 2010). The window period of service access is three months upon enrollment. With the gatekeeping system, 
CBHI members have to first seek services at contracting facilities, such as dispensaries and district hospitals, and only referral 
patients are sent to provincial or regional hospitals (Annear et al., 2011) in Cambodia at Kampot operational health district and in 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic at Nambak district. Results: Six key variables were identified as determining the financial 
flows between the subsidy and the insurance schemes and with health providers: population coverage, premium rate, facility 
contact rate, capitation rate, cost of treatment and changes in administration costs. Negative cross-subsidization was revealed where 
capitation was used as the payment mechanism and where utilisation rates of the poor were significantly below the non-poor. The 
same level of access for the poor could have been achieved with a lower Health Equity Fund subsidy if used as a direct 
reimbursement of user charges by the Health Equity Fund to the provider rather than through the Community Based Health 
Insurance scheme. Conclusions: Purchasing premiums for the poor under these conditions is more costly than direct reimbursement 
to the provider for the same level of service delivery. Negative cross-subsidization is a serious risk that must be managed 
appropriately and the benefits of a larger risk pool (cross-subsidization of the poor. Since 2012, 50% of the scheme’s revenue has 
come from premium collection, and the other 50% has come from government subsidization (Lao Government, 2012). 
3. Methodology
3.1. Sample selection and data collection
　　 This study collects data of rural households in Savannakhet Province, which is located in the center of Lao PDR. The 
province has the largest land area and population size. According to the Center National Health Insurance (NHI) Bureau report in 
2015, Savannakhet Province had the largest and most fluctuating number of CBHI members of all the provinces. The household 
survey is carried out in two districts from September 13-27, 2016 and included 580 self-employed households randomly drawn 
from eight villages. Samples are recruited by a three-stage sampling technique according to the following reasons:
　　 ・There are 15 districts in Savannakhet Province. Since 2014, eight of the districts reported increasing numbers of CBHI-
enrolled households, while the remaining districts have faced a decreasing number of CBHI members over time. Note that the 
province capital district needs to be removed from our selection because its infrastructure differs from that of the other districts. To 
ensure that the results account for the views of heterogeneous respondents, we intentionally select two representative districts with 
increasing and decreasing numbers of CBHI members. Accordingly, we choose Champhone and Xaibouly Districts, which have 
the largest coverage of CBHI among increasing and decreasing districts1, for this study.
　　 ・As our focus is households in remote areas, to ensure that the experiment can plausibly be conducted in these areas, we 
purposively designate only type II villages with a homogeneous infrastructure surveillance of “1 1 0 1 1 1 0”2. Finally, we identify 
three villages in Champhone District and six villages in Xaibouly District. However, one village in Xaibouly District is removed 
due to accessibility constraints.
　　 ・All informal-sector households3, which are the targets of the CBHI scheme, are eligible for this study. However, in practice, 
we purposely omit monks because interviews with them are implausible. The eligible population are stratified into three groups: 
CBHI active members, non-members, and ex-members. Member respondents are randomly drawn from a list of currently active 
CBHI members in each village, whereas ex-members are randomly selected from a list of those who dropped out before August 
2016. Non-members are randomly selected from a list of households in each village excluding households that work in formal 
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sectors (employed households), member households and 
dropout households. Finally, there are 580 stratified random 
samples, representing 46% of the eligible population. Our 
samples comprise 210 (36%), 72 (13%), and 298 (51%) active 
members, ex-members, and non-members, respectively.
　　 The sample households are asked about demographic 
characteristics, asset endowment, income and expenditure 
sources, financial activities, CBHI scheme and health related 
information, social networks, and household shocks during the 
last 12 months preceding the survey visit. Investigators are 
employed and t ra ined based on the content  of  the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire is pretested prior to the main 
survey.
　　 As is customary, we visit the chief of each village a few 
days beforehand to inform the objectives and tentative 
procedure of the experiment. Once the list of random 
respondents is recruited, a day prior to the experiment the 
village chief announces the names of assigned household 
members to join with the family book and CBHI member card 
(if his/her household was enrolled in the CBHI scheme) at the 
Figure 1. Map of Savannakhet Province in Lao PDR.
given location (usually at temples). For convenience, every 6 respondents are appointed one-hour intervals from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
　　 To test the null hypothesis and answer two additional research questions, the samples are managed in the following 
categories:
　　 ・Full sample: we use all CBHI members (as treated subjects), all non-members and all ex-members (as untreated subjects) 
regardless if subjects simultaneously engaged in the village fund (hereinafter referred to as “VF subjects”)4.
　　 ・Subsample 1: To observe the results in the absence of the CBHI ex-members, subsample 1 is equivalent to the full sample 
excluding the ex-members.
　　 ・Subsample 2: Similarly, subsample 2 equals the full sample subtracting the VF subjects.
　　 ・Subsample 3: This category is especially the focus of our efforts as both the ex-members and VF subjects are removed from 
the sample.
　　 Table 1 shows the description and measurement of the treatment, potential covariates, and outcome variables employed in 
this study. To address the impact variation associated with household size, we observe both aggregate and per capita outcomes. 
Summary statistics of the full sample and subsamples of treated and untreated households are presented in Table 2. The mean 
difference test shows that the comparison groups have consistently significant differences on certain pre-intervention 
characteristics, especially household head age and education, household size, toilet availability in the household, engagement in 
village party and women union, and average distance from the village to the district hospital. These differences in baseline 
characteristics would lead to differences in selected outcomes even in the absence of the CBHI scheme enrollment. In particular, 
the differences are significant for aggregate expenditure, expenditure on education, expenditure on food, other expenditures, rice, 
number of cows and poultry holdings. However, the imbalances of baseline characteristics are mitigated by the IPTW technique as 
shown in Table 3.
3.2. Estimation model
　　 For the cross-sectional observational study, the marginal causal effect of intervention can be evaluated by three main 
approaches including instrumental variables (IV), regression discontinuity designs (RDD), and propensity score method (White & 
Raitzer, 2017). Among the three approaches, propensity score method is gaining widespread use in the non-experiment evaluation 
literature due to data unavailability (Pirracchio et al., 2012). The propensity score is the probability of treatment assignment 
conditional on observed baseline covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). There are four techniques that the propensity score is 
used, the most common technique is to match treated and untreated individuals on the propensity score, so-called propensity score 
matching (PSM) (Haukoos & Lewis, 2015). The more recent technique is called inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW), 
which subjects are weighted based on the estimated propensity score. The basic idea of this technique is similar to sampling weight 
so that samples are representative of a specific population (Morgan & Todd, 2008). Joffe et al. (2004) illustrated how weighting by 
the inverse probability of treatment can construct an artificial population in which baseline covariates are not systematically 
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Table 1. Variable description and measurements
Variable Type Measurement
Treatment
 CBHI member Dummy 1 if households are currently the members of CBHI scheme, 0 otherwise
Potential covariates
Household head
 Gender Dummy Gender of the household head. 1 if male, 0 otherwise
 Age Continuous Age of household head in years
 Education Continuous Schooling years of household head
Household
 Size Continuous Number of individuals living in the same household
 Land Continuous Agricultural land holding size in square meters
 Toilet Dummy Toilet availability in the household. 1 if have, 0 otherwise
 Village party a Dummy Any member in the household is member of village party. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
 Women union Dummy Any member in the household is member of women union. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Village
 Distance Discrete Average distance from the village to the district hospital in kilometers
Behavior
 α Continuous The degree of respondent’s risk aversion towards probability prospect b
Outcomes variables c
Income Continuous Total income in 1,000LAK
Income per capita Continuous Total income per capita in 1,000LAK
Expenditure Continuous Total expenditure in 1,000LAK
Expenditure per capita Continuous Total expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Health Continuous Health expenditure in 1,000LAK  (including transportation expenditure to health care 
facilities)
 Health per capita Continuous Health expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Education Continuous Education expenditure in 1,000LAK
 Food Continuous Food expenditure in 1,000LAK
 Food per capita Continuous Food expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Transportation Continuous Transportation expenditure in 1,000LAK (excluding transportation expenditure to 
health care facilities)
 Transportation per capita Continuous Transportation expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Energy Continuous Energy expenditure in 1,000LAK (including electricity, gas, wood, charcoal, oil, etc.)
 Energy per capita Continuous Energy expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Water Continuous Water expenditure in 1,000LAK
 Water per capita Continuous Water expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Telephone Continuous Telephone expenditure in 1,000LAK
 Telephone per capita Continuous Telephone expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Maintenance Continuous Maintenance expenditure in 1,000LAK (including money paid for fixing agricultural 
assets, houses, vehicles, etc.)
 Maintenance per capita Continuous Maintenance expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
 Other expenditures Continuous Other expenditures in 1,000LAK (including investment, livestock purchasing, associ-
ation fee, donations, rent, clothes, cosmetics, etc.)
 Other expenditures per capita Continuous Other expenditures per capita in 1,000LAK
Hospitalization Dummy Any member in the household hospitalized. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Rice Continuous Paddy rice yield in kilograms
Rice per capita Continuous Paddy rice yield per capita in kilograms
Cow Continuous Number of cow owned
Poultry Continuous Number of poultry owned
a Village party and women union are the local government authorities.
b Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested that individuals tend to overweigh low-probabilities which may favor of both lottery and insurance. The 
function would be linear if α= 1, but S-shaped and inverted S-shaped if α> 1 and 0<α<1, respectively. Inverted-S shape of probability weighting function 
favors risk-seeking and risk-averse preferences for small-probability and moderate- or high-probability prospects of losses, respectively (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). As stated in the study of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), probabilities below 30% are treated as small-probabilities. We employed the risk 
elicitation method of Tanaka et al. (2010) to obtain the parameter. The details on methodology and results of the experiment are reported in a separate 
paper. The parameter represents the behavior variable of the respondents in which 88.45% of our respondents are household heads or spouses.
c The various income and expenditure categories, hospitalization, and rice yield are data in the last 12 months preceding the survey.
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correlated with treatment assignment. One advantage of the IPTW technique is that we can directly check and ensure the balance 
of the baseline covariates between treated and untreated groups (Linden & Adams, 2012). Unlike the PSM, the IPTW maximizes 
data available. Austin (2010) showed empirical evidence that the IPTW technique outperforms the other three propensity score 
techniques. Additionally, Austin (2013) suggested that the IPTW technique performs better precision than the PSM technique. In 
spite of the rapidly increasing application of the IPTW in recent years, especially in the field of health economics (Vaughan et al., 
2015; Maeda et al., 2016; Nielsen et al., 2017), it is still scarce in the health insurance setting.
　　 As a matter of fact, the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR was established for particularly self-employed households of which the 
screening of the beneficiaries is on a voluntary basis. Due to the self-selection bias associated with non-experimental data, to 
compare the outcomes between treated households (CBHI households) and untreated households (non-CBHI households) will 
result in biased estimates of the scheme’s effect. Therefore, in the absence of experimental data, we employ the IPTW technique to 
evaluate the impact of the CBHI scheme on hospitalization, income, various expenditure categories, rice yield, and livestock 
holdings of participated households in rural Lao PDR. Following Joffe et al. (2004), the IPTW technique follows four steps to 
estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT) as follows:
　　 1. To examine whether the impact of the CBHI scheme is prone to be confounded, we regress each potential covariate on the 
treatment dummy as the following equation (Linden & Adams, 2012):
　　  (1)
　　 where X is each covariate. T is treatment. β1 is not significantly different from zero if X is considered balanced between 
treated and untreated groups.
　　 2. Then, these potential covariates are used to estimate the propensity score. Let the probability that a household would enroll 
in the CBHI scheme given the observed baseline covariates as p(x)≡Pr(T=1|X), the score can be estimated as follows:
　　  (2)
　　 X is a vector of the observed baseline covariates. 
　　 As our interest is the impact of the CBHI scheme among the enrolled households, based on the estimated propensity score, 
p
 
̂ (x), the inverse probability of treatment weight for ATT estimation is defined as follows (Austin & Stuart, 2015):
　　  (3)
　　 where wi is the weight of household i. Note that, for treated households (Ti=1), wi=1 and untreated households (Ti=0), . 
This weight sets the treated households as the reference population. 
　　 3. We re-estimate step 1 with weight to construct an artificial population in which individual potential covariates are 
independent of the treatment assignment.
　　 4. Finally, ATT is estimated using the weighting technique (Lunceford & Davidian, 2004; Austin & Stuart, 2017).
　　  (4)
　　 where Yi is the outcome of household i. N1 and N0 are the number of treated households and untreated households, 
respectively. 
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. Estimation results
　　 To estimate ATT that is not confounded, we need to mitigate the covariate imbalances as summarized in Table 2 by propensity 
score weighting. Table 3 shows the results of step 1 and step 3 as mentioned in the estimation model section. The four left-hand-
side columns right after the covariates column are unweighted estimates and the four right-hand-side columns are estimates 
weighted by the propensity score. As shown, the unweighted estimates report the statistically significant imbalances of many 
baseline covariates. The CBHI households tend to have a more educated household head, larger household members, more toilets 
at home, engage in the village party and women union, and live in the villages that are relatively closer to the district hospital. 
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However, once the weight is used, the imbalances are all removed. We now ensure that the ATT estimates is less confounding by 
the selected covariates.
　　 The estimates of ATT for the full sample and subsamples are reported in Table 45. Subsample 3 is particularly the center of 
our interest because both CBHI ex-members and VF subjects are excluded. As a sensitivity analysis, we report the estimates from 
four models with different covariate combinations. The same models are applied across the four categories of samples to allow the 
ATT estimates to be comparable.
　　 For direct outcomes, we find no evidence of the CBHI scheme impact on health expenditures and hospitalization. The 
estimates show consistent signs as expected but fail to reject the null hypothesis. Such findings are consistent regardless of the 
presence of the VF subjects but no ex-members in subsample 1, including ex-members but no VF subjects in subsample 2, and the 
absence of both CBHI ex-members and VF subjects in subsample 3.
　　 For indirect outcomes, however, the results show positive impacts of the scheme on rice production per capita in the full 
sample and all subsamples. Although the significance level fades away in model 2 of subsample 2 and 3, which VF subjects are 
excluded, it might be caused by fewer baseline covariates controlled. To be more precise, the rice per capita increases on average 
over 80 kg per year. The effect is slightly magnified and the significance level increases significantly when VF subjects are pooled 
in the samples. As the fact that rice production is the function of not only labor supply but also capital.
　　 Further, we also find strong and robust evidence that the scheme significantly increases the number of cow holdings. The 
impacts are rather similar irrespective of whether CBHI ex-members are present or not. The CBHI households own almost two 
heads of cow more than non-CBHI households. More interestingly, the effect is stronger in the absence than the presence of VF 
subjects in the samples. The findings support our hypotheses that the CBHI scheme leads to an increase in agriculture production 
and livestock holdings of CBHI enrolled households in rural Lao PDR.
4.2. Robustness confirmation
　　 To reinforce our findings, the robustness of the IPTW estimates is checked with an alternative measurement method, 
coarsened exact matching (CEM), which is a causal inference without balancing check (Iacus et al., 2012). Estimates of sample 
average treatment effect on the treated (SATT) based on the CEM method is presented in Appendix C. The findings show consistent 
signs and significance levels, only the degree of effects slightly varies. Overall, the estimates by the CEM method provides 
supporting evidence for the robustness perspective. 
Table 3. Covariate weighting
Covariates Unweighted Weighted
Full Subsample Subsample Subsample Full Subsample Subsample Subsample
sample 1 2 3 sample 1 2 3
(579) (507) (408) (365) (579) (507) (408) (365)
Gender -0.098 -0.105 -0.405 -0.419 -0.011 -0.023 0.050 0.133
(0.238) (0.249) (0.283) (0.295) (0.261) (0.282) (0.320) (0.348)
Age 1.982 * 2.492 ** 0.418 0.686 -0.192 -0.382 -0.463 -0.746
(1.158) (1.197) (1.431) (1.466) (1.216) (1.322) (1.500) (1.586)
Education 0.927 *** 1.145 *** 1.388 *** 1.638 *** -0.126 -0.19 -0.313 -0.453
(0.333) (0.342) (0.398) (0.405) (0.406) (0.488) (0.508) (0.642)
Size 0.704 *** 0.754 *** 0.512 ** 0.523 ** 0.025 0.033 -0.021 -0.035
(0.184) (0.195) (0.221) (0.231) (0.215) (0.236) (0.261) (0.293)
Land 96.108 -635.833 628.894 -96.206 840.8 1,234 487 1,263
(1,904.94) (2,067.75) (2,479.48) (2,637.02) (1,945) (2,067) (3,238) (3,094)
Toilet 0.958 *** 1.133 *** 1.543 *** 1.675 *** 0.018 0.038 -0.003 -0.002
(0.230) (0.235) (0.342) (0.345) (0.241) (0.253) (0.355) (0.367)
Village party 0.060 *** 0.063 *** 0.055 ** 0.055 ** 0.010 0.027 0.015 0.033
(0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035)
Women union 0.087 ** 0.101 *** 0.118 *** 0.137 *** -0.009 -0.010 -0.019 -0.024
(0.037) (0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.057) (0.064)
α 0.053 * 0.054 * 0.026 0.012 -0.009 -0.013 -0.021 -0.029
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046)
Distance -1.571 *** -1.966 *** -2.172 *** -2.56 *** 0.059 0.171 0.035 0.102
(0.463) (0.479) (0.547) (0.564) (0.400) (0.419) (0.426) (0.437)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4. ATT estimates based on the IPTW method
Full sample (579) Subsample 1 (507) a Subsample 2 (408) Subsample 3 (365)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 520.7 560.0 1,056 1,357 -710.9 -712.2 297.1 530.1 -1,127 -895.4 571.6 204.4 -2,577 -2,417 294.3 -295.7
(1,820) (1,823) (1,697) (1,702) (2,243) (2,275) (1,934) (1,983) (2,493) (2,473) (1,961) (2,250) (3,171) (3,253) (2,131) (2,613)
Income per capita -45.35 -31.44 113.9 126.9 -282.1 -276.4 -6.884 -24.02 -323.7 -278.2 70.86 -39.62 -629.5 -620.2 16.74 -160.4
(366.7) (371.0) (319.1) (335.7) (469.8) (481.1) (363.7) (400.9) (558.9) (558.2) (414.2) (494.6) (731.3) (751.4) (452.4) (585.8)
Expenditure 959.4* 907.3 908.5 1,018* 1,114* 979.9 879.0 1,077* 777.5 710.5 965.3* 914.6 1,128* 1,051* 1,170** 1,140*
(542.8) (558.1) (591.0) (539.4) (588.0) (629.1) (675.5) (589.4) (595.3) (585.9) (582.3) (585.9) (630.9) (632.7) (596.2) (610.8)
Expenditure per capita 153.5 147.1 163.0 170.6* 180.8* 160.7 165.0 181.6* 139.5 129.3 186.9 172.4 201.8 181.1 226.8* 209.0
(101.1) (103.1) (106.4) (99.93) (108.8) (114.7) (117.3) (107.5) (127.9) (125.5) (123.1) -124.9 (135.3) (135.1) (123.5) (129.9)
Health -3.744 -22.73 -18.27 -23.64 -12.02 -37.91 -32.96 -48.70 -88.97 -115.0 -110.5 -120.3 -110.8 -143.1 -148.5 -169.3
(71.38) (76.10) (74.54) (76.36) (83.05) (90.62) (87.14) (91.63) (82.38) (92.62) (90.48) (95.04) (100.5) (114.3) (112.8) (122.6)
Health per capita -0.950 -3.753 -2.797 -4.212 -2.962 -6.869 -5.917 -9.015 -11.59 -16.33 -15.57 -17.20 -14.90 -20.78 -21.78 -25.26
(11.67) (12.41) (12.14) (12.49) (13.73) (14.91) (14.29) (15.12) (14.27) (15.78) (15.55) (16.31) (17.18) (19.33) (19.13) (20.78)
Education 146.6 156.7 180.0 157.5 219.6 219.3 240.9 167.3 206.2 191.9 266.2 247.1 339.6 329.5 380.5 308.9
(202.8) (202.6) (204.2) (201.5) (206.3) (206.3) (206.5) (216.5) (252.3) (253.0) (250.2) (239.4) (242.0) (239.7) (233.2) (242.0)
Food 101.8 107.4 102.7 115.8 200.5 201.6 146.5 221.7 18.22 16.39 115.7 67.07 178.5 194.4 232.3 223.6
(160.0) (164.4) (187.5) (164.4) (172.3) (180.4) (228.8) (178.1) (165.7) (164.7) (157.0) (164.5) (158.2) (155.4) (156.2) (155.6)
Food per capita 18.25 20.06 22.68 22.02 32.07 32.44 29.03 36.76 -3.755 0.448 14.98 6.287 22.44 24.73 31.82 29.71
(25.82) (26.07) (27.66) (26.24) (26.71) (27.54) (31.62) (27.44) (34.05) (31.20) (31.44) (32.97) (31.81) (30.99) (31.86) (32.18)
Transportation -20.82 -45.38 -56.27 -9.852 -16.10 -63.82 -87.38 -6.396 -52.07 -82.92 -55.41 -41.79 -47.24 -72.27 -53.86 -31.26
(119.5) (129.6) (133.3) (114.7) (143.7) (162.8) (164.8) (135.0) (149.1) (155.9) (130.9) (137.9) (195.1) (204.2) (151.2) (165.1)
Transportation per capita -11.60 -16.63 -14.18 -9.158 -12.97 -22.75 -19.37 -10.41 -18.92 -25.02 -14.01 -16.43 -22.78 -29.18 -15.64 -18.81
(23.54) (25.82) (23.87) (22.42) (29.21) (33.36) (28.75) (26.80) (34.37) (36.13) (26.99) (31.54) (45.98) (48.55) (31.06) (38.67)
Energy 114.3 95.86 84.66 107.1 85.63 58.78 41.52 78.23 118.1 112.1 71.67 110.5 102.0 94.53 50.83 98.64
(74.47) (80.43) (91.65) (77.29) (88.70) (99.52) (118.4) (93.87) (74.97) (75.74) (108.8) (77.81) (81.63) (83.58) (125.0) (82.76)
Energy per capita 20.64 17.73 19.13 20.37 16.06 11.79 13.70 15.89 19.96 18.47 17.75 19.93 16.37 14.00 15.23 17.15
(12.73) (13.57) (13.60) (12.80) (14.84) (16.43) (16.20) (15.01) (14.89) (15.16) (15.68) (14.55) (17.15) (17.65) (17.11) (15.88)
Water 25.57 25.57 33.05 35.05 44.36 43.22 51.10 56.21 16.31 6.263 55.19 34.62 43.69 41.08 85.57** 70.00*
(37.64) (38.22) (41.54) (37.50) (38.15) (41.38) (44.85) (38.54) (39.17) (38.89) (38.55) (38.49) (39.09) (39.58) (39.09) (38.68)
Water per capita 4.083 3.685 5.663 6.065 6.157 5.866 7.388 8.624 -0.470 -2.563 5.731 2.872 4.061 3.069 10.67 9.050
(6.443) (6.599) (6.959) (6.382) (6.646) (7.202) (7.696) (6.692) (7.551) (7.560) (7.538) (7.471) (7.646) (7.880) (7.784) (7.578)
Telephone 47.24 44.38 50.40 52.49 67.62 59.89 61.39 69.85 2.718 -1.198 21.58 14.16 28.09 24.83 35.38 32.72
(46.28) (46.28) (45.95) (45.65) (50.38) (50.44) (49.99) (48.87) (48.70) (48.98) (46.86) (46.83) (53.76) (54.27) (49.72) (49.51)
Telephone per capita 5.099 5.016 6.249 6.165 7.984 7.187 7.700 8.804 -0.485 -0.952 3.010 1.767 4.133 3.539 5.638 5.389
(8.204) (8.135) (7.975) (8.046) (8.729) (8.579) (8.393) (8.340) (9.343) (9.338) (8.797) (8.918) (9.942) (9.798) (8.931) (9.049)
Mainteanance 53.06 37.53 11.51 53.41 54.69 17.46 -18.58 38.09 119.7** 113.7** 118.7** 110.1** 136.8*** 129.2** 117.2** 108.6**
(111.0) (123.6) (141.9) (108.2) (119.6) (148.4) (175.2) (123.2) (49.53) (49.67) (49.29) (49.36) (51.10) (52.21) (51.93) (52.22)
Maintenane per capita 8.099 5.706 1.508 8.107 8.022 2.119 -4.012 5.182 22.12** 20.85** 21.62** 20.15** 25.39*** 23.68** 21.50** 20.14**
(17.32) (19.48) (22.64) (16.77) (18.85) (23.80) (28.35) (19.43) (9.028) (8.965) (8.779) (8.939) (9.192) (9.259) (9.042) (9.343)
Other expenditures 494.4** 507.3** 518.8** 528.7** 468.1* 480.7* 474.2* 498.8* 437.3 469.3 482.3 493.3 457.1 452.5 470.4 497.8
(240.5) (221.3) (225.3) (231.5) (273.9) (251.7) (247.6) (258.6) (333.7) (306.5) (307.1) (318.2) (351.0) (351.9) (317.9) (332.1)
Other expenditures per 
capita
95.87* 100.3** 104.9** 102.7** 92.76 97.73* 99.62* 99.32* 101.5 107.6 114.9 113.2 103.4 102.0 112.4 112.3
(52.84) (49.11) (49.51) (51.23) (58.92) (54.29) (52.77) (56.03) (76.01) (70.84) (70.48) (73.31) (79.39) (78.90) (71.85) (75.80)
Hospitalization 0.0449 0.0454 0.0294 0.0392 0.0467 0.0435 0.0366 0.0513 0.0575 0.0647 0.0547 0.0625 0.0248 0.0359 0.0317 0.0403
(0.0404) (0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0433) (0.0428) (0.0432) (0.0422) (0.0489) (0.0469) (0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0546) (0.0517) (0.0508) (0.0506)
Rice 654.6** 640.0** 645.7** 677.8** 686.3** 660.5** 654.0** 714.5** 228.7 161.3 214.2 282.3 278.6 212.8 263.9 365.8
(285.5) (285.4) (279.6) (282.6) (304.7) (303.1) (290.6) (298.0) (274.3) (269.0) (261.2) (261.0) (306.1) (296.8) (272.6) (275.5)
Rice per capita 109.7*** 107.6*** 110.8*** 110.3*** 112.8** 110.2** 109.8** 112.2** 93.28* 77.21 89.02* 95.14* 100.2* 82.42 93.04* 103.8**
(41.56) (41.59) (41.21) (41.51) (44.32) (44.12) (42.89) (44.03) (50.02) (48.29) (48.20) (48.59) (54.00) (51.95) (50.16) (51.46)
Cow 1.098*** 1.095*** 0.987** 1.124*** 1.143*** 1.078** 0.853* 1.090** 1.968*** 1.996*** 1.819*** 2.015*** 1.976*** 1.937*** 1.625*** 1.968***
(0.404) (0.399) (0.420) (0.412) (0.443) (0.446) (0.478) (0.469) (0.502) (0.501) (0.523) (0.504) (0.540) (0.548) (0.571) (0.547)
Poultry 1.882 2.010 1.732 1.919 2.640* 2.565* 2.420* 2.585* 1.001 1.176 0.909 0.999 1.818 2.076 1.777 1.827
(1.405) (1.383) (1.395) (1.395) (1.474) (1.449) (1.449) (1.456) (1.795) (1.755) (1.770) (1.767) (1.924) (1.851) (1.838) (1.864)
Robust standard errors in parentheses a Subsample 1: (Full sample) - (Ex-members)   Subsample 3: (Full sample) - (Ex-members) - (Subjects engaged in village fund)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Subsample 2: (Full sample) - (Subjects engaged in village fund)
5. Conclusion
　　 In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the CBHI scheme on household welfare, focusing on indirect impacts on rice 
production and livestock holdings. We use household surveys in rural villages of Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR, to test the null 
hypothesis. Based on the fact that the CBHI is a voluntary-based scheme, self-selection bias may exist. To this end, we employ the 
technique of IPTW to mitigate imbalances in pre-intervention covariates between treated and untreated samples. Our analysis 
suggests that the CBHI scheme has direct impacts on neither health expenditure nor hospitalization. In contrast, we find that there 
are substantial indirect impacts of participation in the CBHI scheme on rice per capita and cow holdings. Such findings might 
reflect the fast recovery of illness, improved health status of household members, or lower incidence of catastrophic healthcare 
expenditure among enrolled households.
　　 The empirical evidence in this study suggests the potential benefits of the CBHI scheme on agricultural production and 
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livestock holdings, which both are likely to lead to poverty reduction in the long run. 
　　 Further, the lack of significant evidence on direct benefits of the scheme might be a reason explained why the current CBHI 
scheme has received less popularity from informally employed households. To encourage more enrollment, it is important to 
understand the preferences of potential enrollees towards the hypothetical CBHI scheme. In addition, supply-side improvement, 
such as quality of service and geographic access, is also critical to scale-up the scheme.
　　 It is worth noting some limitations of this study. To observe the direct impacts, we fail to capture the direct OOPs, the 
frequency of health care seeking, and the frequency of hospitalization. Also, we use quantity instead of a monetary value of 
livestock holdings in analysis.
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Endnotes
1 However, CBHI coverage in Champhone and Xaibouly Districts accounted for only 0.21% and 0.1% of the province population in 2015, respectively.
2 Lao Statistics Bureau classifies villages into three types: Village type I indicates an urban village with road access, electricity, water supply, regular market, 
and administrative office; Village type II is a rural village with road access; and Village type III is a rural village without road access. “1 1 0 1 1 1 0” 
condition indicates road access (yes), electricity (yes), health care facility (no), clean water (yes), village drug kits (yes), primary school (yes), and 
regular market (no).
3 Household is defined as a group of people in a housing unit living together as a family and sharing the same kitchen.
4 The village fund program is available in all eight selected villages of our study, the program targets the similar group of population with the CBHI 
scheme. The unit of enrollment is household. However, the program is implemented by different organizations.
5 See Appendix A for covariate balancing and Appendix B for propensity score distributions of the selected models.
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Appendix A. Covariate balancing for ATT estimation
Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized 
differences Variance ratio
Standardized 
differences Variance ratio
Standardized 
differences Variance ratio
Standardized 
differences Variance ratio
Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched
Full sample
 Gender -0.035 -0.006 1.072 1.011 -0.035 0.003 1.072 0.994 -0.035 0.000 1.072 1.000
 Age 0.150 -0.015 0.799 0.823 0.150 0.009 0.799 0.861 0.150 -0.011 0.799 0.837
 Education 0.244 -0.027 0.833 0.670 0.244 -0.005 0.833 0.689
 Size 0.322 0.009 1.274 1.139 0.322 0.008 1.274 1.133 0.322 -0.010 1.274 1.112 0.322 0.011 1.274 1.154
 Land 0.004 0.044 0.818 0.901
 Toilet 0.388 0.009 0.573 0.981 0.388 0.012 0.573 0.976 0.388 0.007 0.573 0.986 0.388 0.010 0.573 0.979
 Distance -0.309 0.018 0.477 0.683 -0.309 0.017 0.477 0.667 -0.309 0.022 0.477 0.689
 Village party 0.233 0.032 2.313 1.093 0.233 0.053 2.313 1.161 0.233 -0.008 2.313 0.978 0.233 0.018 2.313 1.049
 Women union 0.200 -0.023 1.263 0.980 0.200 -0.029 1.263 0.975 0.200 0.011 1.263 1.010 0.200 -0.012 1.263 0.989
 α 0.162 -0.023 1.099 0.970 0.162 -0.009 1.099 0.980 0.162 -0.010 1.099 0.988
Subsample 1
 Gender -0.038 -0.008 1.077 1.015 -0.038 -0.010 1.077 1.019 -0.038 -0.011 1.077 1.020
 Age 0.189 -0.028 0.808 0.848 0.189 0.002 0.808 0.871 0.189 -0.026 0.808 0.857
 Education 0.303 -0.036 0.859 0.631 0.303 0.006 0.859 0.663
 Size 0.341 0.012 1.228 1.091 0.341 0.003 1.228 1.065 0.341 -0.004 1.228 1.062 0.341 0.021 1.228 1.130
 Land -0.029 0.061 0.712 0.899
 Toilet 0.472 0.019 0.536 0.961 0.472 0.025 0.536 0.950 0.472 0.013 0.536 0.974 0.472 0.020 0.536 0.959
 Distance -0.383 0.039 0.465 0.711 -0.383 0.025 0.465 0.680 -0.383 0.039 0.465 0.713
 Village party 0.251 0.089 2.527 1.299 0.251 0.095 2.527 1.327 0.251 0.025 2.527 1.071 0.251 0.051 2.527 1.156
 Women union 0.233 -0.024 1.326 0.980 0.233 -0.022 1.326 0.981 0.233 0.003 1.326 1.002 0.233 -0.025 1.326 0.979
 α 0.166 -0.032 1.093 0.902 0.166 0.006 1.093 0.967 0.166 -0.001 1.093 0.950
Subsample 2
 Gender -0.146 0.020 1.325 0.969 -0.146 0.002 1.325 0.997 -0.146 0.001 1.325 0.998
 Age 0.031 -0.048 0.815 0.871 0.031 -0.004 0.815 0.911 0.031 -0.035 0.815 0.878
 Education 0.368 -0.067 0.857 0.634 0.368 -0.035 0.857 0.645
 Size 0.235 -0.008 1.084 0.986 0.235 -0.002 1.084 1.016 0.235 -0.016 1.084 0.937 0.235 -0.001 1.084 0.999
 Land 0.026 0.027 1.031 0.762
 Toilet 0.555 0.004 0.354 0.987 0.555 0.011 0.354 0.966 0.555 0.002 0.354 0.995 0.555 0.014 0.354 0.958
 Distance -0.440 0.008 0.425 0.801 -0.440 0.012 0.425 0.809 -0.440 -0.002 0.425 0.802
 Village party 0.211 0.050 2.091 1.154 0.211 0.045 2.091 1.135 0.211 0.002 2.091 1.006 0.211 0.015 2.091 1.043
 Women union 0.268 -0.040 1.351 0.971 0.268 -0.035 1.351 0.974 0.268 0.014 1.351 1.011 0.268 0.002 1.351 1.001
 α 0.089 -0.058 0.922 0.799 0.089 -0.004 0.922 0.863 0.089 -0.013 0.922 0.836
Subsample 3
 Gender -0.151 0.054 1.338 0.919 -0.151 0.016 1.338 0.975 -0.151 0.018 1.338 0.971
 Age 0.051 -0.063 0.826 0.918 0.051 -0.013 0.826 0.925 0.051 -0.051 0.826 0.905
 Education 0.438 -0.087 0.886 0.570 0.438 -0.037 0.886 0.599
 Size 0.237 -0.011 1.044 0.937 0.237 0.006 1.044 0.964 0.237 -0.017 1.044 0.886 0.237 0.000 1.044 0.963
 Land -0.004 0.053 0.938 0.828
 Toilet 0.618 0.007 0.336 0.977 0.618 0.020 0.336 0.939 0.618 -0.000 0.336 1.000 0.618 0.022 0.336 0.935
 Distance -0.513 0.020 0.411 0.822 -0.513 0.011 0.411 0.809 -0.513 0.004 0.411 0.808
 Village party 0.212 0.111 2.102 1.400 0.212 0.093 2.102 1.320 0.212 0.017 2.102 1.046 0.212 0.040 2.102 1.118
 Women union 0.317 -0.047 1.457 0.966 0.317 -0.032 1.457 0.977 0.317 0.007 1.457 1.006 0.317 -0.007 1.457 0.995
 α 0.046 -0.079 0.847 0.702 0.046 0.004 0.847 0.805 0.046 -0.009 0.847 0.759
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Does Community-based Health Insurance Have Potential Impacts on Direct and Indirect Outcomes?  
Evidence from Rural Villages, Savannakhet Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic 83
Appendix C. SATT estimates based on the CEM method
Full sample (579) Subsample 1 (507) a Subsample 2 (408) Subsample 3 (365)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income -4,754 -1,558 1,345 -0.782 -3,924 -5,144 -116.7 -116.7 -2,282 -1,953 415.9 415.9 -3,503 -2,228 456.9 456.9
(4,039) (2,793) (2,033) (2,276) (6,021) (3,691) (2,160) (2,160) (4,321) (2,928) (2,316) (2,316) (4,589) (3,147) (2,392) (2,392)
Income per capita -1,175 -568.6 40.85 -329.2 -1,188 -1,185 -166.7 -166.7 -848.0 -480.9 -67.14 -67.14 -836.6 -559.2 -134.3 -134.3
(949.7) (624.2) (409.8) (518.1) (1,507) (802.7) (429.6) (429.6) (1,061) (668.1) (520.1) (520.1) (1,075) (719.6) (537.5) (537.5)
Expenditure 55.81 716.3 922.9 871.6 1,396 408.6 1,233 1,233 464.2 567.5 1,205* 1,205* 1,043 808.1 1,597** 1,597**
(884.2) (649.8) (721.5) (740.1) (875.6) (985.4) (780.3) (780.3) (804.7) (682.6) (647.6) (647.6) (900.7) (706.0) (623.6) (623.6)
Expenditure per capita -39.33 68.27 121.6 64.55 210.1 18.52 188.6 188.6 -25.80 107.8 201.3 201.3 149.8 143.6 228.5 228.5
(180.5) (130.2) (136.9) (155.5) (205.4) (185.3) (139.6) (139.6) (189.3) (143.5) (141.2) (141.2) (199.3) (147.8) (142.5) (142.5)
Health -55.17 13.86 -9.777 -15.84 -63.01 -4.242 3.887 3.887 -19.20 -109.4 -134.5 -134.5 -137.3 -131.8 -149.8 -149.8
(98.80) (80.10) (81.36) (90.17) (85.91) (92.63) (85.26) (85.26) (85.83) (99.39) (89.57) (89.57) (124.4) (111.5) (112.3) (112.3)
Health per capita -5.281 1.822 -2.489 -2.998 -8.256 -1.332 -0.630 -0.630 -1.360 -15.43 -17.69 -17.69 -15.80 -19.43 -24.37 -24.37
(17.04) (13.05) (13.75) (15.62) (15.63) (15.72) (14.38) (14.38) (16.07) (16.92) (15.56) (15.56) (21.05) (18.85) (19.33) (19.33)
Education 151.5 134.3 125.0 -143.0 439.0 311.5 321.3 321.3 262.0 183.1 398.2 398.2 623.9** 298.7 469.0* 469.0*
(303.5) (226.9) (245.1) (435.5) (295.2) (229.7) (221.9) (221.9) (304.7) (273.7) (263.7) (263.7) (266.1) (265.3) (246.2) (246.2)
Food -11.82 93.23 150.4 279.7* 226.6 218.9 96.68 96.68 59.59 99.92 234.5 234.5 155.9 198.5 239.2 239.2
(204.8) (182.2) (195.5) (165.4) (147.9) (158.5) (293.4) (293.4) (200.4) (153.8) (155.2) (155.2) (171.8) (153.5) (165.8) (165.8)
Food per capita 1.294 11.70 25.35 36.25 28.68 24.87 19.75 19.75 -10.32 13.77 33.08 33.08 11.16 26.66 24.11 24.11
(33.64) (30.44) (30.14) (30.06) (28.33) (28.53) (38.69) (38.69) (40.80) (29.89) (29.79) (29.79) (33.78) (30.56) (36.77) (36.77)
Transportation -316.2 -51.06 -122.6 -79.20 -241.8 -179.6 -113.5 -113.5 -444.7 -189.7 -91.67 -91.67 -187.5 -179.1 -15.19 -15.19
(295.6) (175.2) (171.9) (155.7) (423.4) (277.2) (184.8) (184.8) (312.1) (197.4) (161.9) (161.9) (279.1) (212.4) (156.0) (156.0)
Transportation per capita -87.52 -29.60 -37.71 -33.97 -82.27 -54.15 -36.87 -36.87 -118.0 -42.47 -30.07 -30.07 -50.47 -44.42 -23.31 -23.31
(68.25) (39.89) (34.83) (35.70) (106.2) (57.79) (37.17) (37.17) (77.92) (43.00) (38.47) (38.47) (66.64) (47.10) (39.17) (39.17)
Energy -33.72 115.2 87.91 88.55 66.42 22.33 122.3 122.3 -82.20 -9.260 45.06 45.06 -2.665 -15.67 200.2*** 200.2***
(114.9) (78.03) (94.55) (90.50) (145.3) (111.6) (89.46) (89.46) (116.8) (163.5) (126.1) (126.1) (162.8) (165.6) (74.50) (74.50)
Energy per capita -14.26 14.04 13.99 8.255 1.680 -1.652 18.59 18.59 -23.78 6.108 11.61 11.61 2.032 4.410 27.43* 27.43*
(23.09) (15.97) (16.38) (17.06) (34.01) (21.45) (16.26) (16.26) (24.10) (21.47) (18.41) (18.41) (26.87) (22.12) (16.13) (16.13)
Water -30.00 -4.609 16.42 -3.145 50.03 1.291 32.74 32.74 28.28 30.06 33.38 33.38 51.89 57.36 74.16* 74.16*
(58.14) (42.51) (48.86) (48.00) (51.67) (63.44) (51.60) (51.60) (48.20) (39.40) (39.76) (39.76) (46.24) (40.55) (41.17) (41.17)
Water per capita -8.235 -1.567 -1.721 -7.456 4.630 -2.783 1.707 1.707 -4.185 -0.619 0.835 0.835 1.853 4.040 7.231 7.231
(10.53) (7.426) (8.640) (8.595) (10.41) (11.03) (9.135) (9.135) (9.926) (8.462) (8.466) (8.466) (9.412) (8.822) (8.712) (8.712)
Telephone -36.18 32.03 34.67 8.779 43.57 -11.83 59.84 59.84 -32.97 19.62 21.94 21.94 18.59 29.42 53.53 53.53
(52.94) (47.91) (52.48) (51.54) (50.68) (55.48) (52.67) (52.67) (67.35) (48.34) (54.85) (54.85) (51.10) (50.56) (49.00) (49.00)
Telephone per capita -10.36 -1.309 2.734 -4.464 4.489 -8.890 6.283 6.283 -14.82 2.407 3.061 3.061 -0.154 4.022 4.224 4.224
(10.82) (9.694) (9.715) (10.17) (10.97) (11.38) (9.372) (9.372) (15.35) (9.400) (10.33) (10.33) (9.644) (9.580) (9.906) (9.906)
Mainteanance -161.1 57.22 -28.43 85.99 106.5** -132.8 -46.06 -46.06 95.68 117.6** 127.9** 127.9** 157.1*** 116.3** 98.06* 98.06*
(228.0) (126.6) (197.0) (125.3) (51.37) (293.1) (207.5) (207.5) (62.80) (49.30) (53.79) (53.79) (56.86) (51.37) (54.71) (54.71)
Maintenane per capita -25.66 7.066 -6.574 11.61 19.59* -23.44 -8.087 -8.087 12.68 21.49** 22.14** 22.14** 25.30** 21.30** 16.73 16.73
(38.25)  (19.76) (31.98) (19.07) (10.58) (48.23) (33.75) (33.75) (13.35) (8.775) (9.345) (9.345) (10.67) (9.054) (10.33) (10.33)
Other expenditures 545.4** 321.9 668.5*** 648.0*** 763.1** 176.5 752.8*** 752.8*** 597.7** 425.5 569.9* 569.9* 363.0 434.3 627.9* 627.9*
(249.4) (330.2) (205.0) (232.6) (303.4) (409.4) (213.5) (213.5) (288.8) (372.8) (322.0) (322.0) (583.7) (394.2) (329.1) (329.1)
Other expenditures per 
capita
106.9* 54.63 127.0** 119.2** 162.1** 38.56 141.8*** 141.8*** 102.0 90.37 119.4 119.4 74.15 89.26 121.1 121.1
(64.54) (72.50) (51.35) (58.74) (74.38) (85.94) (50.85) (50.85) (64.19) (84.89) (76.73) (76.73) (127.8) (88.81) (78.33) (78.33)
Hospitalization  0.0399  0.0490  0.00251  0.00943  0.0393  0.0559  0.0676  0.0676  0.0656  0.0746  0.0440  0.0440  0.0231  0.0476  0.0690  0.0690 
 (0.0536)  (0.0435)  (0.0454)  (0.0513)  (0.0675)  (0.0496)  (0.0441)  (0.0441)  (0.0579)  (0.0479)  (0.0506)  (0.0506)  (0.0602)  (0.0503)  (0.0516)  (0.0516) 
Rice 618.5** 677.5** 744.9** 785.6** 755.3** 666.3** 614.2** 614.2** 548.2 173.7 369.5 369.5 556.5* 219.1 489.6* 489.6*
(309.6) (292.1) (294.4) (329.6) (375.5) (315.4) (274.7) (274.7) (341.1) (295.1) (300.1) (300.1) (333.4) (304.3) (294.4) (294.4)
Rice per capita 96.18* 94.97** 106.6** 98.12* 123.6* 108.9** 101.1** 101.1** 120.2* 75.22 98.31* 98.31* 108.7* 75.28 101.0* 101.0*
(56.04) (46.03) (49.33) (54.45) (66.75) (51.64) (48.91) (48.91) (64.14) (52.13) (53.43) (53.43) (65.36) (54.28) (58.06) (58.06)
Cow 1.357*** 1.047** 1.314*** 1.056** 1.449*** 1.102** 1.090** 1.090** 2.330*** 1.883*** 1.895*** 1.895*** 2.739*** 1.681** 1.854*** 1.854***
(0.478) (0.470) (0.446) (0.445) (0.500) (0.512) (0.444) (0.444) (0.603) (0.632) (0.611) (0.611) (0.559) (0.658) (0.544) (0.544)
Poultry 1.325 2.136 1.734 2.992* -0.146 1.686 1.960 1.960 -0.582 0.420 0.893 0.893 0.906 1.219 2.143 2.143
(1.790) (1.432) (1.500) (1.603) (2.208) (1.738) (1.564) (1.564) (2.127) (1.881) (1.924) (1.924) (2.402) (1.867) (1.870) (1.870)
Robust standard errors in parentheses a Subsample 1: (Full sample) - (Ex-members)   Subsample 3: (Full sample) - (Ex-members) - (Subjects engaged in village fund)
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   Subsample 2: (Full sample) - (Subjects engaged in village fund)
